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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper documents key cyclical properties of external aid flows from the point of 
view of the recipient country: their degrees of volatility and predictability, and the way in 
which they covary with domestic economic activity. Why the focus on the cyclical properties 
of aid? First, available estimates of the welfare cost of business fluctuations in developing 
countries suggest that they are significantly larger than those in industrial economies.
2 
Developing countries tend to be subject to more frequent and larger external shocks and are 
less able to cope with them due to pervasive liquidity constraints and the lack of effective 
countercyclical policy tools. A direct implication of this result is that advice to developing 
countries should pay more attention to reducing volatility. Second, these countries are also 
likely to be recipients of large volumes of aid disbursements of foreign aid, which have been 
found to be very volatile themselves (see below). This feature of aid can indirectly offset 
some of its direct beneficial effects by, for example, complicating the conduct of fiscal and 
monetary policy or exacerbating exchange rate variability (Edwards and van Wijnbergen, 
1989). In particular, the negative welfare effects of volatile aid flows will be larger the higher 
the covariance between domestic output fluctuations and aid disbursements.
3 
 
 In principle, the problem of aid volatility is analogous to that of volatility of 
commodity prices in countries that rely heavily on revenues from the exports of a single 
commodity. However, only a few, recent empirical studies have focused on the magnitude 
and consequences of aid volatility (and on best practices to deal with them) in contrast with 
the case of export price instability, where the main issues have been dealt with extensively in 
the economic literature.
4 Lensink and Morrisey (2000) find that the effect of aid on growth is 
insignificant unless some measure of aid uncertainty is included in the regression, and that 
uncertainty about aid is detrimental to growth. Gemmell and McGillivray (1998) find that 
shortfalls in aid are most frequently followed by reductions in government spending, and 
sometimes by increases in taxes, or both. In other words, the typical aid-receiving country is 
                                                   
2 Pallage and Robe (2001b) estimate that, on average, the welfare cost of output volatility in 
Sub-Saharan Africa could be as much as 15-20 times higher that in the U.S. 
3 Assuming that government spending is financed only with tax revenues and foreign aid, it is 
possible to show that the loss function of a risk-averse policymaker interested in minimizing 
deviations of public spending from planned levels is a positive function of the covariance 
between aid disbursements and actual revenues. We thank T.N. Srinivasan for this point. 
4 For example, Varangis and Larson (1996) provide a clear explanation of the problems 
posed by commodity price uncertainty and clarify the differences among the main 
instruments to deal with price variability, unpredictability and expenditure smoothing. 
Similarly, Engel and Meller (1993) contain a set of case studies analyzing best policies to 
neutralize external shocks in developing countries (typically stabilization funds and the use 
of financial instruments).   - 4 -   
unable to offset an unexpected non-disbursement of aid by borrowing, and has to resort to 
costly, and possibly inefficient, swift fiscal adjustment.
5 Gemmell and McGillivray (1998) 
also find that aid is significantly more volatile than revenue and that, on average, aid tends to 
be procyclical (that is, countries tend to receive more aid in years when economic activity is 
on the rise; this, in turn, may imply a positive correlation between aid and fiscal revenues). 
These results are corroborated by Pallage and Robe (2001a) and suggest that the typical 
pattern of aid disbursement (highly volatile and procyclical) is likely to be welfare reducing.
6 
To the best of our knowledge, Collier (1999) is the only study that finds aid (in Sub-Saharan 
Africa) to be less volatile than tax revenues, and countercyclical.
7 
 
In this paper we re-examine these issues using a broader database than that used in 
the studies cited above (we use both publicly available time-series data as well as a cross-
section of detailed data provided by IMF desk-officers of countries receiving aid). In line 
with the studies of Gemmell and McGillivray (1998) and Pallage and Robe (2001a), we find, 
first, that aid is substantially more volatile than either fiscal revenue or GDP and, further, that 
this relative volatility increases with the degree of aid dependency as measured by the aid-to-
revenue ratio. We also find that aid tends to be mildly procyclical, and that countries that 
suffer from relatively high revenue volatility also exhibit higher volatility in aid receipts. 
These results suggest that aid tends to enhance budgetary and overall economic instability. 
 
Second, time-series data show that commitments by donors exceed disbursements 
systematically and that aid cannot be predicted reliably on the basis of donors’ commitments 
alone. Cross-sectional data from IMF-supported programs reveal that commitment-based 
projections tend to overestimate project and, to a much higher degree, program aid. In 
addition, intra-year disbursements of program aid differ significantly from projections. 
Despite their poor track record as a predictor of disbursements, commitments continue to be 
used in budgetary exercises in aid recipient countries mainly as a result of pressures from 
donor countries and/or agencies. 
 
Since the economic effects of aid are largely determined by the recipient country’s 
budgetary practices, we stress the need to account properly for aid volatility when designing 
                                                   
5 Of course, incomplete adjustment to the shortfall in aid is likely to crowd out private 
investment and/or create inflationary pressures (Hadjimichael et. al., 1995). 
6 We must stress here that the negative welfare effect referred-to above relates exclusively to 
the cyclical movement of aid. Throughout this paper, we abstract from the issue of aid 
effectiveness, or even from the effect of aid volatility on growth. For a recent survey of those 
issues see, for example, Hansen and Tarp (2000, 2001). 
7  Collier (1999) is also the only study based on non detrended data. He takes his results to 
imply that “a budget with a large component of aid would be more reliable than one with a 
low component of aid” (p. 542) and that all committed aid should be included in the budget.   - 5 -   
adjustment programs in aid receiving countries—particularly when it comes to planning 
against the possibility of delays and/or shortfalls in aid disbursements vis-à-vis commitments. 
Finally, we discuss briefly measures that can be taken by both donors and aid-recipients—
mainly in the areas of compliance with program objectives, program design, coordination 
among donors and improved disbursement procedures in donor countries—in order to reduce 
the volatility, procyclicality and unpredictability of aid and, thus, enhance its welfare effects.  
 
  The paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses briefly our data sources, as 
well as some problems posed by the need to select a common unit of measurement for 
several variables and the limitations of using aggregate data on aid. Section III looks at 
various measures of the relative instability of foreign aid and fiscal revenues. Section IV 
deals with the issue of predictability of aid flows and the information content of 
commitments made by donors. This section also looks at the accuracy of predictions of aid 
made at various stages of a program supported by the donor community. Finally, Section V 
concludes with a discussion of the main policy implications of our findings. 
 
 
II.   DATA SOURCES AND MEASUREMENT ISSUES 
 
Before turning to the assessment of the relative volatility and predictability of foreign 
aid, in this section we discuss the origin and scope of our data, as well as some problems 
associated with their measurement. These problems relate to the limitations of any empirical 
analysis based on aggregate aid estimates; problems linked to the selection of a common unit 
of measurement (denominator) for aid and domestic revenues; and the time-series properties 
of aid and revenue and the need to take them into account in order to measure volatility and 
predictability properly. 
 
A.   The Data Set 
 
The data on aid used in this study were taken from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators (WDI), which, in turn, are based on raw data compiled by the OECD 
and grouped under the heading of “Official Development Assistance” (ODA). The time 
series of commitments and actual disbursements of aid correspond to the line “Long-term 
funds by official and private donors, excluding IMF financing”. In principle, aid data are 
available for more than 100 countries, however, not all aid recipients represent relevant cases 
for the purposes of this study.  
 
The pool of aid recipients changes over time. Within our sample period some former 
aid recipients became donors, others experienced a substantial change in their composition of 
aid, and several former communist countries joined the pool of aid recipients in the early 
1990s. Thus, to compile a consistent database, we considered only cases that meet the 
following selection criteria: (i) at least eight annual observations available; (ii) presence of 
IMF-supported program(s) during the sample period; and (iii) population of at least 500,000.   - 6 -   
The second criterion was intended to capture the mobilizing impact of IMF programs on aid 
flows and their composition.
8 The third criterion was aimed at eliminating the small-country 
bias. These three criteria narrowed the potential sample to 72 countries for which aid data 
were available for the period 1975-1997 or some portion thereof. 
 
Fiscal data used in the paper—total revenue in the local currency—were drawn from 
two sources. For the majority of countries (60), the series were obtained from the IMF’s 
International Financial Statistics (IFS). For the remaining 12 countries, mostly from sub-
Saharan Africa and Asia, we used internal IMF data: in 10 cases we relied on the IMF’s 
African Department fiscal database, and in the other two the data were provided by IMF desk 
officers.
9 Even with these additions, we were able to complete 1975-97 revenue series for 
only 47 countries; the available series are shorter for the other 25 countries (see Appendix  
Table A2). 
 
B.   The Composition of Aid 
 
The OECD definition of ODA aggregates balance-of-payments support, capital 
projects, food aid, debt and emergency relief, peacemaking efforts, technical cooperation, 
concessional funding to multilateral development funds, and some other small categories of 
aid. More than 90 percent of the value of aid falls in the first two categories: some 50-60 
percent is disbursed in the form of untied balance-of-payment support (the so-called program 
aid), while the remainder comes in the form of tied, project-related aid. These averages, 
however, may be affected by the presence of a few large recipients of program aid (say, 
Mexico in 1995 or Indonesia in 1998). Poor, aid-dependent countries generally have 
above-average proportions of project aid.  
 
Given the high degree of heterogeneity among the components of aid, the use of an 
aggregate concept of aid is problematic, particularly when aid volatility is at the center of the 
discussion (Box 1 discusses the key macroeconomic differences between the two main 
categories of aid). For one thing, certain categories of aid are bound to be more volatile than 
others—for example, food aid is disbursed only during disaster periods—and, therefore, 
higher aggregate aid volatility may simply reflect shifts in the composition of total aid. In 
fact, aggregate volatility of aid may be high (low), even though the volatility of aid 
components may be low (high) when the covariance between the components is positive 
(negative) and relatively large (Box 2 illustrates this point in the case of Malawi). 
                                                   
8 As explained below, most aid takes the form of project-related aid or untied, program aid. 
The second category is practically non-existent in countries without IMF-supported 
programs. 
9 The results obtained for these countries do not differ systematically from those obtained for 
countries for which published data was available.   - 7 -   
 
Box 1.  Components of Aid and Their Economic Impact 
 
Foreign aid is not a homogeneous variable, even though a popularly held view 
assumes that the fungibility of its various components makes it homogeneous. For 
example, aid earmarked for the construction of schools could free, ceteris paribus, 
financial resources for, say, military buildup. But what if aid is not fungible because 
the preferences of donors and aid recipients differ? The available evidence shows that 
the economic consequences of various forms of aid are not identical, see Lancaster 
(1999) for a review. 
 
First, consider aid tied to specific investment projects. If donors' and 
recipients' preferences are identical, the effect of project aid would be some increase 
in investment, imports, and budgetary spending on either tradables or nontradables—
with the composition being decided by the preferences of domestic agents—as 
domestic fiscal resources earmarked for a project are replaced with aid. However, if 
aid is financing projects that the government would otherwise not have undertaken, 
the effect of aid would be simply the associated increase in investment and imports of 
tradables, with little or no impact on the domestic currency or absorption. 
 
The second major category of aid is program aid. These funds could be considered 
totally fungible: additional program aid could finance higher spending, lower taxes, a 
reduction in debt, or a combination of all three, with the authorities deciding the 
composition. However, program aid finances typically additional spending on 
nontradable goods and, as such, that it has a strong impact on interest and exchange 
rates, often crowding out domestic absorption and hindering exports (Younger, 1992).   - 8 -   
 
Box 2.  Volatility and Composition of Aid: Malawi in the 1990s 
 
Malawi is a good example of the complexity of aid flows. Aid, albeit significantly 
volatile, has been more stable on aggregate than two of its components (as suggested by the 
coefficients of variation shown below). Numerically, the lowest total aid receipts in any year 
have been 40 percent of maximum total aid receipts during that period and 62 percent of the 
average. However, the same ratios for program aid have been 35 percent and 56 percent and 
for project aid 29 percent and 44 percent, respectively. The ratios for total revenue have 
been much higher at 77 percent and 88 percent, respectively. 
 
Table 1.  Malawi: Various Types of Aid Flows, 1992/93-1998/99 
(In percent of GDP) 
 
  1992/93  1993/94  1994/95  1995/96  1996/97  1997/98  1998/99  Coefficient 
of variation 
 Total aid  10.1  11.3  20.6  10.9  12.0  8.1  18.7  0.36 
    Program  2.9  9.4  9.3  5.8  8.7  4.2  12.1  0.44 
    Project  4.6  1.9  4.8  5.1  3.3  3.9  6.6  0.35 
    Food  2.6  0.0  6.5  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.92 
 Total 
revenue  19.5  17.1  15.9  17.6  16.3  15.1  18.2  0.09 
 Status of 
the 
 Program 
I          I   
 
 
Sources: Malawian authorities; and Fund staff estimates and projections. 
 
Note: ‘I’ indicate interruptions in the ESAF arrangement that affected disbursements during 
the whole fiscal year. 
 
Aid is volatile also in the very short term. For example, during a period of less than two 
months in 1998/99, Malawi received about US$150 million of balance-of-payment support. 
This inflow of foreign exchange, which was more than twice as large as total disbursements 
during the previous 18 months, was equivalent to more than 150 percent of programmed 
reserve money or 11 percent of GDP. As a result, the Reserve Bank of Malawi had to 
undertake massive liquidity operations in order to prevent a triple-digits expansion of the 
monetary stock.   - 9 -   
 
But there is an additional dimension to the aid heterogeneity problem: different forms 
of aid have different conditionality. For example, some aid is disbursed if an IMF-supported 
program is considered to be “on track”, others may have sector-specific conditionality and 
their disbursements depend on complex donor-recipient interactions. As a result, increased 
aid volatility may also reflect, to varying degrees, problems with project implementation, 
compliance with macroeconomic conditionality, or disruptions to the normal disbursement 
process originating in the donor country. 
 
The literature offers little evidence on the empirical relevance of the points discussed 
above. On the one hand, insufficient data prevent comprehensive cross-country studies from 
differentiating among categories of aid. On the other hand, the few small-scale studies that 
have tried to decompose aid into various subcategories have either rejected parameter 
constancy across regions (White, 1992 and Mosley et al., 1987 and 1992) or found the impact 
of aid to be insignificant in a cross-country set up (Mosley et al., 1992). Individual country 
studies are similarly inconclusive (see, for example, Pack and Pack, 1990 and 1993, for 
Indonesia and the Dominican Republic, respectively). In light of these results, we use the 
OECD composite definition of aid in Sections III and IV.A and investigate aid volatility and 
predictability separately for project and program aid in Section IV.B. 
 
C.   Common Denominator for Aid and Fiscal Revenue 
 
Statistical measures of relative volatility are affected by the choice of a common 
denominator for aid and revenue. We use two alternative denominators for aid and revenue: 
percentages of GDP and current U.S. dollars in per-capita terms. From a domestic policy 
point of view, the percent-of-GDP denominator is more relevant as aid-receiving 
governments generally do their financial programming either in domestic currency or in 
percentages of GDP rather than in U.S. dollars per capita. Moreover, the percent-of-GDP 
denominator captures better the impact of aid flows on exchange rate than the U.S. dollars 
per capita denominator. WDI data on GDP in local currency units, annual average market 
exchange rates, and population were used. 
 
Why does the choice of a common denominator matter? Since our series for aid are 
denominated in U.S. dollars and those for revenues in domestic currency units, our 
comparisons of volatility of aid and revenue are affected by another variable, namely the 
exchange rate.
10 On the one hand, when expressing aid and revenue in U.S. dollars per capita, 
the volatility of domestic revenue becomes a composite measure of volatility of revenue in 
local currency terms and volatility of the exchange rate. On the other hand, when expressing 
the variables in percent of GDP, the volatility of aid becomes a composite measure of 
                                                   
10 The impact of exchange rate volatility can be very large: on average, the volatility of the 
exchange rate (measured by the coefficient of variation) in trended, raw data is almost forty 
times higher than that of aid.   - 10 -   
volatility of aid in U.S. dollars, volatility of the exchange rate, and the impact of those 
variables on GDP.
11 Thus, measures of relative volatility of aid tend to be lower when the 
series are expressed in U.S. dollars per capita, as compared to percentages of GDP. However, 
the implicit bias varies from country to country, as the volatility of the exchange rate between 
the domestic currency and the U.S. dollar tends to be larger in aid-receiving countries with 
floating exchange rates. As a result, due to the lack of a preferred scale variable for aid and 
revenue, we use both transformations, and keep in mind the biases that each of them are 
likely to introduce when interpreting our results. 
 
D.   The Time Series Properties of Aid and Revenue  
 
  Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests (not reported here but available upon request) indicate 
that the series for aid and revenue are generally nonstationary (or, in a few cases, stationary 
around a deterministic trend), and this finding is robust to the choice of the denominator.
 
What are the implications of trends for measuring volatility? The standard statistics 
(variance, the standard deviation, and the coefficient of variation) are designed for variables 
that revert to a constant mean and their application to trended data may result in serious 
biases. To avoid this problem, we detrended our aid and revenue series using the Hodrick-




III.   MEASURING THE RELATIVE VARIABILITY OF AID AND REVENUE 
 
This section reviews our findings on the relative volatility of aid and domestic fiscal 
revenue. We calculate “trend-corrected” variances for aid and revenue, 
A q  and 
R q , respectively, and a measure of relative volatility defined as the ratio of the two, 
R A q q / = F . 
 
In the rest of this section we examine the properties of the measure of relative 
volatility, F . In particular, we: (i) calculate F  for each country; (ii) look at the frequency 
distribution of individual country F ’s and test the significance of averages and medians 
across countries;
13 (iii) test the relationship of F ’s vis-à-vis other variables, such as the 
                                                   
11 Donors determine aid volumes either directly in U.S. dollars or in their own currencies, 
which typically fluctuate much less vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar than currencies of aid-receiving 
countries, and, hence, the volatility of dollar-denominated aid is unaffected by the donors’ 
currencies exchange rate volatility. 
12 Following Pesaran and Pesaran (1997), we set the “smoothing” parameter l  at 7. 
13 Since the distribution of F  is not normal (it is bounded on the lower end), we checked the 
statistical significance of sample averages using an F-test. The significance of sample 
(continued…)   - 11 -   
correlation coefficients between (detrended) aid and revenue (i.e., cyclicality of aid) and the 
ratio of (not detrended) aid to revenue (i.e., aid dependency); and (iv) in order to check the 
robustness of our results, we arrange countries into two sub-groups according to their degree 
of aid dependency, and compare the results for the full sample with those obtained for the 
smaller samples. Thus, we carry out our calculations not only for the full sample of 72 
countries, but also for a sub-sample of countries with aid-to-revenue ratios of 10 percent or 
more (57 and 55 countries when measured in percent of GDP and U.S. dollars per capita, 
respectively) and also for a sub-sample of countries with aid-to-revenue ratios of 50 percent 
or more (33 and 29 countries when measured in percent of GDP and U.S. dollars per capita, 
respectively). The first cutoff point eliminates the more developed Latin American and Asian 
countries from the sample, while the second cutoff point defines a group of highly aid-
dependent countries, mostly from Sub-Saharan Africa. The results are presented in Table 1. 
 
Our first finding is that aid is more volatile than revenue, particularly in countries 
with a high aid-to-revenue ratio. On the one hand, when variables are expressed in percent of 
GDP, aid is on average more volatile than revenue in all samples, and this result is 
statistically significant (the F-test fails to reject the null hypothesis that the average F’s are 
larger than one at the 1 percent level of significance in every case).
14 Furthermore, the 
relative volatility of aid grows with aid dependence: the average value of F increases from 
3.94 to 7.42 as the sample is narrowed down to the most aid-dependent countries (the results 
for the median values of F  follow a similar pattern). On the other hand, when the variables 
are expressed in U.S. dollars per capita, the average F is bigger than one in the full sample, 
but the difference from one is statistically insignificant. In the other two samples, aid is on 
average relatively more volatile than revenue and the results are statistically significant; 
again, the average value of F  increases with aid dependency (from 1
1/3 to 3). The estimated 
medians also grow as the sample is restricted to more aid-dependent countries, but they are 
not significantly different from one.
15 
 
  We look also at the frequency of cases in which aid is more (or less) volatile than 
revenue and find stronger evidence in favor of a higher incidence of countries where aid is 
more volatile than revenue ( 1 > F ). When variables are expressed in percent of GDP, the 
share of countries with more volatile aid grows from about half in the full sample to about 
2/3 
in the middle sample, and well over 
4/5 in the sample of the most aid-dependent countries. In 
                                                                                                                                                              
medians, which were used as another way to control for the non-normality of F, was 
checked using a “runs test” (SPSS Inc., 1999, pp. 235-6). 
14 See Appendix Tables A1 and A2 for sample-specific and country-specific estimates of the 
absolute volatility of aid and revenue. 
15 These results confirm that the choice of the scale variable matters. As predicted, when 
variables are measured as a percentage of GDP, the estimated relative volatility of aid tends 
to be higher.   - 12 -   
Table 1.  Relative Volatility of Aid and Revenue (F)
Variables expressed in percent of GDP 1/
Average 3.94 ** 4.96 ** 7.42 **
Median 1.10 2.19 ** 4.91 **
Frequency indicators
Sample size 72 57 33
Number of countries where F>1 37 37 28
Number of countries where F<1 35 20 5
Variables expressed in U.S. dollars per capita 1/
Average 1.33 1.73 * 3.00 **
Median 0.36 0.80 2.25
Frequency indicators
Sample size 72 55 29
Number of countries where F>1 23 23 21
Number of countries where F<1 49 32 8
Source: Table A1 in Appendix [1].
1/ The null hypotheses that F > 1 is tested for averages with the F-test and for medians with the
 "runs test" ; '*' and '**' indicate statistical significance at the 5 and 1 percent level, respectively.
Full sample
   Sample 1       
(Aid-to-revenue 
ratio larger than 
10 percent)
     Sample 2        
(Aid-to-revenue 
ratio larger than 50 
percent)  - 13 -   
the case of variables denominated in dollar-per-capita terms, there are more cases of aid 
being relatively less variable that revenues in the full and middle samples. In contrast, in the 
last sample, countries with higher relative aid volatility outnumber those with higher 
volatility of revenue by a margin of 5 to 2. 
 
Second, we find that the relationship between the relative volatility of aid and aid 
dependency is robust.
16 The first column of Table 2 shows the correlation coefficients 
between F  and aid dependency in each of the three samples. The common denominator 
makes little difference in this case: the simple correlation coefficients between F and the 
aid-to-revenue ratio are of the order of 0.5-0.6 in the full sample, 0.5 in the middle sample, 
and a much lower 0.1-0.2 in the sample with aid-to-revenue ratios of 50 percent or more. The 
rank correlation coefficients (Spearman’s r) are about 0.7-0.9 in the full and middle samples 
and about 0.2-0.5 in the most aid dependent group. The positive correlation between the 
relative volatility of aid and aid dependency is statistically significant for all but the smallest 
sample. The lack of statistical significance in the smallest sample may reflect the fact that, by 
eliminating countries with a low aid-to-revenue ratio, we lower substantially the variance of 
the aid-to-revenue ratio series. In any case, we would stress that the average Fis about 20 
times higher in the 10 most aid-dependent countries than in the 10 least aid-dependent 
countries. 
 
Third, we find that, if anything, aid is modestly procyclical (second column of 
Table 2). The full-sample averages of individual correlation coefficients of detrended aid and 
revenue are positive, of similar size in all samples, but statistically insignificant in all but one 
case. However, a look at the distribution of correlation coefficients (Figure 1) reveals that 
they are concentrated to the right of zero and that only a small number of countries exhibit 
pronounced countercyclical pattern of aid. Furthermore, the share of countries with a 
correlation coefficient smaller than –0.3 falls between 5 percent and 10 percent, whereas the 
share of countries with a correlation coefficient larger than 0.3 is 35-40 percent depending on 
whether the variables are expressed in percent of GDP or in U.S. dollars per capita. Thus, 
although the average results provide only weak support for the hypothesis that aid is 
procyclical, aid is found to be countercyclical only in a very small number of countries.  
 
Finally, we find that shocks to domestic revenue are correlated with those to foreign 
aid (last column of Table 2). The correlation coefficients between the variances of aid (
A q ) 
and revenue (
R q ) are stable at about a for the variables in percent of GDP and grow from  
                                                   
16 A closer look at the data (Appendix Table A1) reveals that this result is not driven by 
lower absolute revenue volatility in aid-dependent countries. For example, narrowing the full 
sample to countries with aid-to-revenue ratios of more than 50 percent leads to increases in 
average absolute aid volatility of 90 percent and 80 percent when variables are expressed in 
percent of GDP and in dollar-per-capita terms, respectively. By comparison, revenue 
volatility increases by 80 percent and declines by 97 percent, respectively.   - 14 -   
Table 2.  Interdependence Between Aid and Revenue Flows
(Aid and revenue are measured as differences from its Hodrick-Prescott filter)
Correlation coefficient
Relative volatility and Aid and revenue 2/ Volatilities of aid
aid-to-revenue ratio 1/ and revenue 3/
Variables expressed in percent of GDP
All countries
Simple correlation coefficient (Pearson) 0.53 ** 0.07 0.29 *
Rank correlation coefficient (Spearman's rho ) 0.85 ** 0.40 **
sample size: 72
Sample 1 (aid-to-revenue ratio larger than 10 percent)
Simple correlation coefficient (Pearson) 0.45 ** 0.08 0.28 *
Rank correlation coefficient (Spearman's rho ) 0.72 ** 0.52 **
sample size: 57
Sample 2 (aid-to-revenue ratio larger than 50 percent)
Simple correlation coefficient (Pearson) 0.20 0.05 0.27
Rank correlation coefficient (Spearman's rho ) 0.49 ** 0.55 **
sample size: 33
Variables expressed in US dollars per capita
All countries
Simple correlation coefficient (Pearson) 0.56 ** 0.10 0.08
Rank correlation coefficient (Spearman's rho ) 0.89 ** 0.19
sample size: 72
Sample 1 (aid-to-revenue ratio larger than 10 percent)
Simple correlation coefficient (Pearson) 0.49 ** 0.09 * 0.10
Rank correlation coefficient (Spearman's rho ) 0.78 ** 0.56 **
sample size: 55
Sample 2 (aid-to-revenue ratio larger than 50 percent)
Simple correlation coefficient (Pearson) 0.08 0.11 0.92 **
Rank correlation coefficient (Spearman's rho ) 0.18 0.76 **
sample size: 29
Source: IFS, World Development Indicators, AFR fiscal database; and Fund staff calculations.
Note: '*' and '**' indicate statistical significance at the 95 percent and 99 percent level, respectively.
1/ Correlation coefficient between each country's F and its aid-to-revenue ratio.
2/ Average of individual countries' correlation coefficients between detrended aid and revenue.
3/ Correlation coefficient of each country's aid and revenue variances (q).  - 15 -   
Figure 1.  Frequency Distribution of the Cyclical Character of Aid 1/
(Relative frequency)
Source: Table A2.
1/ Measured by the correlation coefficient of aid and domestic fiscal revenue.
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0.2 to 0.9 when the variables are denominated in dollars per capita. While the sign of the 
correlation coefficient might have been expected, the size of the correlation coefficients and 
their stability across different samples are surprising. These results further undermine the 
notion that aid tends to smooth out shocks to revenue. 
 
We summarize our main results graphically in Figure 2, where the top panel 
corresponds to variables expressed in percent of GDP and the bottom panel to variables 
denominated in dollars per capita. Each panel captures three dimensions: on the horizontal 
axis we plot the relative volatility of aid, F ; on the vertical axis the correlation coefficient of 
aid and revenue (cyclicality of aid); and each observation is represented by a bubble whose 
size indicates the country’s aid-to-revenue ratio. First, we observe that aid is more volatile 
than revenue in countries with high aid dependency, as most of the “larger” bubbles are to 
the right of the vertical line  1 = F . Second, aid appears to be procyclical, as the majority of 
bubbles are above the horizontal line corresponding to a zero correlation between aid and 
revenue. Moreover, in only a few aid-dependent countries, that is, those with “larger” 
bubbles, aid is countercyclical. This pattern of cyclicality is more pronounced in the bottom 
panel, where aid and revenue are measured in dollar-per-capita terms. 
 
 
IV.   PREDICTABILITY OF AID 
 
In this section we establish some stylized facts regarding the predictability of aid 
both, in general, and in the context of IMF-supported programs. To this end, we carry out 
two separate exercises. The first one is based on time-series data on aid disbursements and 
commitments in current U.S. dollars, and seeks to assess the information content of 
commitments in the context of a simple auto-regressive model for aid disbursements. 
Available time series were typically longer in this case, as there was no need to compute 
them as a percentage of GDP, or constrain them to be of equal length as revenue series. The 
second exercise is based on responses to a questionnaire by IMF country desk economists. 
The results of this questionnaire allow us to test whether there are systematic differences 
between commitments made by donors, projections prepared in the context of IMF-supported 
programs, and actual disbursements. 
 
A.   The Time Series Evidence 
 
Before turning to the estimation of the marginal contribution of commitments, C, to 
the prediction of disbursements, D, we would like to provide some basic information on these 
two variables for our sample of 72 countries. A simple look at individual-country plots of 
their C and D series (available upon request) reveals two salient features: (i) several episodes 
of spikes in commitments that, generally, were not followed by increased disbursements; and 
(ii) a systematic tendency for commitments to exceed disbursements. 
 
The first point reflects a propensity for donors to react, in terms of large increases in 
commitments but not necessarily in disbursements, to positive changes in recipient countries, 
such as in the Central African Republic following the end of Bokassa’s regime in the early    - 17 -   
Figure 2. Characteristics of Aid: Volatility, Cyclicality, and Dependency
(The size of the bubble indicates the aid-to-revenue ratio)
Source: Table A2.
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1990s or the end of the civil war in Mozambique in the mid-1990s. The exception to the 
second point are mainly (but not exclusively) a relatively small number of instances within 
our sample in which a country has received some form of financial help following an 
unforeseen balance of payments crisis. These cases, however, are concentrated among 
countries with relatively higher levels of income per capita and capital mobility, and low aid 
dependency. For the other countries in our sample, the C-to-D ratio was larger than one (i.e., 
commitments exceed disbursements), with the implicit average overprediction of 
disbursements reaching up to 20 percent.
17 
 
While the simple calculations discussed above reveal that commitments tend to 
overestimate disbursements by a relatively wide margin, they do not say much about the 
information value of a commitment figure for predicting aid for the budget. In order to assess 
the marginal value of aid commitments in predicting aid disbursements, we estimated the 




0 t t i t
K
i
i t T C D D e d g b b + + + + = -
= ￿         (1) 
 
where T is a time trend and K represents the lag length. The ability of commitments to help 
predict the future course of disbursements is tested through the statistical significance of g in 
this very simple forecasting equation for disbursements.
18 We would expect that g should be 
not only statistically significant but also positive and close to one if commitments contained 
high marginal information value. Of course, there are no simple a priori interpretations for 
the possible failure of g to be significantly different from zero. Potential reasons for the 
failure of commitments to materialize include, inter alia, non-compliance by the receiving 
country with conditions attached to committed aid, delays associated with administrative 
problems in donor countries, or simply changes in underlying economic and/or political 
developments. Whatever the case, though, we think that it is important to document the 
predictive power of a variable that is widely used in fiscal programming exercises mainly in 
response to pressure from donors. 
 
                                                   
17 Of the 71 countries in the sample (Cambodia had to be excluded from this exercise due to 
the small number of observations available), only 18 received on average more aid than was 
committed. Of these, half have very low aid-to-revenue ratios and are among the best known 
cases of balance of payments crisis-related financial assistance (Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, 
Mexico, Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, and Venezuela). 
18 We want to emphasize here that the purpose of this exercise is not to develop an elaborate 
forecasting model for disbursements but, instead, to test the significance of commitments in 
the context of a parsimonious model. The equation was estimated using aid data on current 
U.S. dollars.   - 19 -   
   Given the nonstationarity of Ct and Dt, the parameter g was estimated by running 
equation (1) in first differences. The estimation process was carried out in two steps. In a first 
step, two alternative values of K were selected from a version of equation (1) that did not 
include Ct: those that minimized the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the Schwartz-
Bayes Information Criterion (SBIC). The value of g was then estimated by adding Ct as a 
regressor in the resulting equations.
19 The results obtained using the AIC are summarized in 
Table 3; there are no substantial differences between the results obtained under the AIC and 
those obtained under the SBIC. 
 
In general, the estimated g’s are not statistically significant, especially in countries 
with higher aid-dependency ratios. When all countries are considered, g is significant at the 5 
percent level in about a of the regressions.
20 In these cases, the average value of g is about 
0.4; however, the median value is smaller (about a), reflecting the fact that the estimated 
value of g was quite large for only a few countries: g was higher than 0.7 in 5 higher-income  
countries with very low aid-to-revenue ratios (Argentina, Mexico, Panama, Turkey, and 
Venezuela).
21 The estimated values of g decreased (and the difference between their average 
and median values narrowed significantly) when the sample of countries was reduced to 
cases in which aid represents at least 10 percent of revenues. The estimated value of g did not 
change further when the sample was reduced to countries where aid represents at least 50 
percent of revenues, but the share of regressions with g’s significant at the 5 percent level fell 
from about a in the full sample to about 
1/5. When the level of statistical significance is 
lowered to 10 percent, none of the conclusions described above changes significantly. 
 
  Two main conclusions can be drawn from Table 3. First, the marginal predictive 
power of commitments made by donors is statistically significant only in a relatively small 
fraction of the countries in our sample, and this fraction falls as the sample is reduced to 
countries where aid is relatively important. Second, even among countries where 
commitments contain statistically significant information about future disbursements, the 
results suggest that commitments should not be taken at face value, but instead should be 
discounted heavily. 
 
  Finally, in line with the results of section III, we explored the relationship between 
predictability of aid, as measured by g, and a few other variables. The top two panels of 
Figure 2 plot the estimated values of g against the aid-to-revenue ratio and GDP per capita, 
respectively (the panels show also a fitted regression line and the estimated regression  
                                                   
19 As a general rule, the initial number of lags was determined as one third of the available 
number of observations. 
20 In one case, Thailand, g is negative and statistically significant. 
21 The estimated value of g was between 0.9 and 1.0 in Argentina, Turkey and Venezuela.   - 20 -   
All countries Sub-sample 1  1/ Sub-sample 2  2/
All regressions
number of countries 71 56 32
(in percent of total sample) 100 100 100
average value of g 0.21 0.13 0.09
median value of g 0.15 0.12 0.07
Regressions where g was significant at 5%
number of countries 24 15 6
(in percent of total sample) 34 27 19
average value of g 0.43 0.32 0.33
median value of g 0.33 0.29 0.31
Regressions where g was significant at 10%
number of countries 30 20 9
(in percent of total sample) 42 36 28
average value of g 0.42 0.31 0.30
median value of g 0.33 0.28 0.29
1/ Countries where aid represents more than 10 percent of government revenues.
2/ Countries where aid represents more than 50 percent of government revenues.
(Estimated values of g in italics)
Table 3. Commitments are Poor Predictors of Actual Disbursements
Equations based on the Akaike Information Criterion  - 21 -   
coefficient). The relationship is negative in the first case, positive in the second case, and the 
estimated regression coefficients are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. These 
results show quite clearly that the predictive power of donors’ commitments tends to be 
lower in poorer and in more aid-dependent countries. The bottom two panels of Figure 3 plot 
the estimated g’s against the two measures of relative aid volatility (F). In both cases, the 
relationship is negative, albeit not statistically significant, indicating only a weak correlation 
between volatility and unpredictability. 
 
B.   How Good are Aid Projections in IMF-Supported Programs? 
 
The Survey 
The results in this section are based on responses by 37 IMF desk economists to a 
questionnaire sent in late 1999 (see Appendix Table A4 for a list of the countries). The 
questionnaire requested information on project and program aid for the most recent program 
period. The majority of the 37 countries in the sample drew financial support from the IMF 
under the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) and a few under General 
Resource Account facilities. It must be stressed that, although the definition of aid employed 
in this questionnaire was intended to be as close as possible to that used by the OECD, in 
many cases the IMF estimates of aid inflows are somewhat smaller. This discrepancy mostly 
reflects the asymmetric nature of information on aid between donors and recipients: data on 
such components as technical assistance, peacemaking efforts, and other smaller categories 
of aid are often not reported to the recipient country and, hence, are not recorded in the 
countries’ fiscal and balance of payments accounts (on which the responses to our 
questionnaires are based). 
 
We received data on project aid at four different junctures related to the life of a 
program, and recorded them under the following labels: (1) “Original projections”, prepared 
by the IMF staff about a year ahead of the start of the program. These projections are based 
on information on past disbursements as well as preliminary and heavily discounted donor 
commitments.
22 (2)“Budget projections,” that is, the authorities’ projection at the time of the 
budget presentation, which usually takes updated commitments by donors at face value. (3) 
“IMF-program projection,” that is, the IMF staff estimate embedded in the financial program. 
Staff of the IMF generally incorporates some 90-95 percent of updated project aid 
commitments into their fiscal projections. (4) “Disbursements”, as recorded by the 
authorities. 
 
Regarding program aid, we received data at the same junctures as in the case of 
project aid, except for the budget estimates, which are generally identical to IMF projections. 
                                                   
22 This figure can be thought of as corresponding to the first year of the medium-term 
projections generated in an existing program or, in the case of countries that did not have an 
ongoing program, a set of estimates used at the start of a negotiation process that would lead 
to the adoption of a program over the next year.    - 22 -   
Figure 3. Aid-Dependent, Poor Countries And Countries With Volatile Aid 
Have Also Less Predictable Aid
Source: Authors' own estimates. 
Notes: The slope of the regression line is denoted by b. '*' and '**' indicate statistical 
significance at the 5 and 1 percent level, respectively.
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Specifically, we have data for: (1) “Original projections” (one-year-ahead projections 
prepared by IMF staff, conditional on past disbursements and heavily discounted preliminary 
donor commitments); (2) “IMF-program projections” (non-discounted, updated commitments 
provided by donors);
23 and (3) “Disbursements”. Unlike in the case of project aid, for 
program aid we were able to obtain also a quarterly breakdown of each of the three annual 
projections. 
 
Not all low-income countries with IMF-supported programs receive both project and 
program aid, and in some cases the distinction between the two is not made.
24 Also, a few 
country desks did not report data that correspond to the definitions of “Original projections” 
or “Budget projections” described above. As a result, we do not have a balanced data set. For 
project aid we obtained: 27 observations for Original projections, 32 for IMF-program 
projections, 24 for Budget projections and 32 for Disbursements. For program aid, we 
obtained: 23 observations for Original projections, 28 for IMF-program projections and 28 
for Disbursements. In order to have a common denominator, all data were expressed in 
percentages of the IMF-program projections. 
 
Results for project aid 
The average Disbursements of project aid fall short of all types of projections 
(Table 4).
25 The ranking of errors in projections vis-à-vis Disbursements is unambiguous: 
Budget projections are the worst with an average error of 15 percent; IMF-program 
projections are the most accurate, with an average error of 5 percent; while Original 
projections come, quite surprisingly, in the middle with an average error of almost 
8 percent.
26 Interruptions in IMF programs appear to have no statistically significant impact  
                                                   
23 Unlike project aid, program aid commitments (and disbursement dates) are updated 
constantly; thus, in this case, the figure for “IMF-Program Projection” refers to the number 
used in the IMF Board meeting documents. 
24 There are reasons to believe that project aid data are of lower quality than those for 
program aid. Project aid disbursements generally take the form of paying invoices from third 
parties such as construction companies, importers, consultants, and so on. Reporting of these 
payments to aid receiving countries is often delayed and occasionally incomplete; some 
countries even lack their own independent systems for project aid monitoring. In contrast, 
program aid disbursements are recorded as a cash transfer in recipient countries’ central 
banks and, as such, can be easily monitored. 
25 While the original projections are fairly close to program projections (higher by only about 
22 percent), budget estimates were almost 10 percent higher than program projections, and 
IMF projections 5 percent higher. 
26 For project aid, one percentage point of prediction error amounts to about 0.1 percent of 
GDP (the average IMF-program projection was 5.2 percent of GDP and the average 
“Disbursement” was 4.8 percent of GDP).   - 24 -   
Table 4.  How good are short-term aid projections?









(as provided by 
the authorities)
Project aid 1/
All countries 102.6 109.5 94.9
Of which:
Without program interruptions 105.2 109.1 94.9
With program interruptions 2/ 88.0 111.6 94.8
Program aid (annual data) 3/
All countries 100.9 . . . 68.5
Of which:
Without program interruptions 106.2 . . . 73.8
With program interruptions 2/ 65.5 . . . 33.8
Of which: 4,5/
Grants
All countries 98.3 . . . 87.3
Of which:
Without program interruptions 98.2 . . . 90.8
With program interruptions 6/ . . . . . . . . .
Loans
All countries 91.7 . . . 61.6
Of which:
Without program interruptions 95.4 . . . 71.4
With program interruptions 65.5 . . . 4.9
Program aid (quarterly data) 7/
All countries . . . . . . 49.3
Of which:
Without program interruptions . . . . . . 46.2
With program interruptions 2/ . . . . . . 82.5
 1/ Data for 27 countries for original projections, 24 countries for budget projections, and 31 countries
for actual outturns.
 2/ Data for 4 countries. In one country, no program aid was committed and none was disbursed.
 3/ Data for 23 countries for original projections and 26 countries for actual outturns.
 4/ Because some country data do no have breakdown for grant and loans, the sum of grants and loans
  does not equal to the total program aid.
 5/ Grant and loan data are available for 19 and 24 countries, respectively.
 6/ Averages are not reported, because only one observation was available.
 7/ Average deviation from the quarterly IMF-program projection.  - 25 -   
on project-aid Disbursements. The fact that Budget projections fare the worst even though 
they are prepared relatively late in the process—and, presumably, with updated 
commitments—reflects the pressure exerted by donors for aid recipient countries not to 
discount their commitments. 
 
  A closer look at the distribution of Disbursements as percentages of IMF-program 
projections (Figure 4, top panel) reveals that, while all projections overestimated 
Disbursements on average, there were plenty of cases in which Disbursements were actually 
underestimated. Out of the 32 countries for which we had data on IMF-program projections 
and Disbursements, 18 countries had their project aid Disbursements fall short of IMF-
program projections by about 20 percent of program projections, while 14 countries had 
project aid Disbursements that exceeded IMF-program projections by roughly the same 
magnitude. 
 
Results for program aid  
Program aid shortfalls vis-à-vis IMF projections are more marked: both Original and 
IMF-program projections overestimated Disbursements on average by more than 30 percent 
(despite some variations in individual cases, original and program projections are practically 
identical on average).
27 The explanation for the much larger prediction errors in program aid 
projections as compared to project aid lies in the different nature of conditionality associated 
with the two types of aid. Unlike project aid, which flows gradually according to 
multiple-year disbursement schedules and entails direct monitoring by donors of some large 
projects, program aid is generally disbursed only if the IMF-supported macroeconomic 
program is on-track (it is held back if the program is off-track). For this reason, in the case of 
program aid, it may be useful to look separately at programs with and without interruptions 
due to breaches in conditionality. 
 
The difference in type of conditionality, however, does not account fully for the much 
more pronounced over-projections in the case of program aid. While countries with program 
interruptions (Central African Republic, Republic of Congo, Zambia, and Papua New 
Guinea) received, on average, only about one-third of program aid commitments, successful, 
uninterrupted programs received still only three-quarters of program aid commitments.
28 So, 
what explains the substantial shortfall vis-à-vis program projections in programs that 
remained officially “on track”? There are three possible explanations: (i) program-aid 
shortfalls originated in donor countries and are not related to recipient countries’ compliance 
                                                   
27 For program aid, one percentage point of prediction error amounts to about 0.05 percent of 
GDP (the average IMF-program projection was 4.7 percent of GDP and the average 
“Disbursement” was 3.2 percent of GDP). 
28 Interestingly, in the group of interrupted programs original projections were some 
35 percent smaller than IMF-program projections, perhaps reflecting original skepticism 
about the prospects of the country securing and adhering to a program.   - 26 -   
Figure 4. Frequency Distribution of Aid Disbursements 1/
(In percent of program projections)
Source: IMF questionnaire; authors' calculations.
1/ The samples contain 33, 28, and 23 countries, respectively. Excluding countries with 
no disbursements and countries with program interruptions.
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with donor conditionality; (ii) aid recipient countries breached donor conditionality, but not 
that associated with the IMF-supported program; or (iii) the overestimation reflects strategic 
behavior by the IMF, given its unique role as arbiter of external assistance. Unfortunately, we 
do not have information to assess the relative importance of these hypotheses. 
 
  The average result of excessively optimistic projections at all junctures is more 
representative in the case of program aid than for project aid (Figure 4, middle panel). Out of 
the 28 countries for which we received data on IMF-program projections and outcomes, 24 
countries saw their Disbursements fall short of IMF-program projections (by an average of 
42 percent of IMF-projected program aid), while only 4 countries recorded program aid 
Disbursements in excess of IMF-program projections (by an average of 14 percent). The 
overestimation of Disbursements exceeded 20 percent in only two countries. 
 
Yet another way of dissecting our results is to compare prediction errors for program 
loans and program grants separately. Aside from differentiating aid that is debt neutral 
(grants) from aid that contributes to debt creation (loans),
29 this analysis allows us to 
compare prediction errors vis-à-vis bilateral and multilateral donors. The differentiation in 
our data is not perfect, however. On the one hand, only bilateral donors disburse grants. On 
the other hand, loans are disbursed both by bilateral and multilateral donors. Still, the results 
show that bilateral aid in the form of program grants—which comprise about one-third of 
total program aid—has a much smaller prediction error than program loans, both bilateral 
and multilateral (bottom part of Table 4). While grant disbursements are lower that program 
projections by almost 13 percent, the corresponding estimate for loan disbursements is 
almost 40 percent. Also the shortfall vis-à-vis the original projection is much smaller for 
grants than for loans. We should mention, however, that the sample size is much smaller than 
in previous cases (19 and 24 countries for grants and loans, respectively), primarily because 
the breakdown of program aid is not available for some countries. 
 
  Program aid not only falls significantly short of the programmed level, but its 
quarterly distribution also differs substantially from the programmed path (Figure 4, bottom 
panel). On average, actual quarterly outturns deviate by about 50 percent from the quarterly 
path estimated at the beginning of the program period. In other words, if, according to the 
program, a country expects to receive 10 million dollars in a given quarter, it gets, on 
average, either 5 million or 15 million. Out of 23 countries for which quarterly data are 
available, only 2 countries received program aid with prediction errors lower than 20 percent 
                                                   
29 From a net-present-value perspective, aid in the forms of loans and grants may differ 
relatively little. Even though loans will have to be repaid eventually, concessional lending is 
quite generous: interest rates are very low and the loan contracts usually offer extended grace 
periods.   - 28 -   
(using the previous numerical example, only 2 countries could expect to get either 8 or 12 
millions of U.S. dollars per quarter).
30 
 
  Unlike the case of donors’ commitments in the context of our “naive” prediction 
model (Section IV.A), the IMF-program projections of aid do not exhibit any systematic 
relationship vis-à-vis either aid dependency or the level of development. Figure 5 plots 
differences between IMF-program projections and Disbursements (expressed in percent of 
the former), against those two variables, separately for project aid and program aid, the latter 
in annual and quarterly frequencies. Although project and annual program aid prediction 
errors seem to be smaller in countries with lower aid-to-revenue ratios, the correlation is not 
statistically significant (top two left panels). Second, project and annual program aid 
prediction errors appear to be completely unrelated to the level of development—the slopes 
of the fitted lines on the right, top two panels are flat and their values are statistically 
insignificant. Finally, the quarterly prediction errors (bottom panels) appear to be declining 
with the aid-to-revenue ratio, and increasing with the level of development, but, again, these 
results are not statistically significant. 
 
The results from our questionnaire suggest that official projections of aid (including 
those of the IMF) are subject to large errors and that, particularly in the case of program aid, 
they seem to exhibit a substantial upward bias. It is somewhat ironic that even with the heavy 
discount of preliminary donors’ commitments embedded in the IMF staff’s Original 
projections, for which the IMF staff is often criticized, those projections tend to overestimate 
Disbursements significantly. Original and IMF-program projections have, on average, 
practically identical forecast errors and, hence, it appears that the additional information that 
should in principle be provided by updated commitments at the beginning of the program  
period, adds in fact very little to the Original projections. The intra-year volatility of program 
aid was found to be remarkably high. 
 
 
V.   CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
In this paper we assess empirically various aspects of the cyclical behavior of aid 
flows. Although the welfare implications of highly volatile and unpredictable aid flows can 
be substantial—especially in countries that receive large volumes of aid—the issue has not 
received enough attention in the literature. Our findings suggest that the typical pattern of 
disbursement of aid tends to enhance budgetary and, possibly, overall economic instability, 
and reduce welfare. Before summarizing these findings, however, we would like to stress our 
hope that this paper will stimulate further research, particularly in assessing the robustness of 
our results to changes in detrending methods, the specific definition of aid flows or even the  
                                                   
30 This calculation was made excluding the countries with program interruptions. The 
average deviation in countries with program interruptions was more than 80 percent.   - 29 -   
Figure 5. Prediction Errors of Aid in IMF Programs
(In percent of program projections)
Source: Authors' calculations.
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units of measurement. We also hope that the paper will help in focusing the attention of 
policymakers on policies aimed at reducing economic instability in poor countries. 
 
We find that aid is substantially more volatile than domestic revenues, that this 
relative volatility grows with the degree of aid dependency, and that these results are robust. 
We also find that aid tends to be mildly procyclical, and that countries that suffer from 
revenue volatility also exhibit higher volatility in aid receipts, perhaps because both revenue 
and aid fluctuations are driven by domestic policy instability.  
 
We also show that aid cannot be predicted reliably on the basis of donors’ 
commitments. There seems to be a tendency for all parties involved (donors, the local 
authorities and the IMF itself) to systematically overestimate aid disbursements in aid-
receiving countries with IMF-supported programs. Given the economic inefficiencies and 
financing difficulties associated with implementing swift fiscal measures to compensate for 
large unexpected shortfalls in aid, our findings suggest that fiscal programming in aid 
receiving countries should rely on cautious assumptions about the availability of committed 
funds and that projections of aid disbursements should be based on past experience rather 
than on promises by donors. Of course, budgets can be designed to accommodate aid 
disbursements in excess of the conservative baseline, but this should be done in a way that 
ensures that domestic-currency funds are released to spending agencies only after the 
equivalent foreign-currency denominated aid has been deposited at the central bank. 
 
Given the relatively high volatility of aid, we find the procyclicality of aid flows 
particularly worrisome, as the two results combined imply that aid is being currently 
disbursed in a welfare-reducing manner. While our results in this regard apply to total aid, 
similar findings for separate components of aid have been obtained in other studies. Grants 
and technical assistance have been found to be procyclical, particularly in Sub-Saharan 
Africa (Pallage and Robe, 2001a). Furthermore, U.S. food aid (PL480)—one category of aid 
that one would expect to be highly countercyclical—has also been found to be mildly 
procyclical (Barrett, 2001). The procyclicality of aid is likely to reflect a variety of factors. 
At the theoretical level, Svensson (2000) shows that when donors are unable to monitor the 
recipient country’s reform effort, a second-best outcome arises in which aid disbursements 
are tied to economic performance, thus rendering aid procyclical. In practice, compliance 
with conditionality from multilateral agencies, and thus timely disbursements of aid, are less 
likely when countries are hit by an unforeseen adverse shock. 
 
There is no presumption that our estimates of aid volatility, predictability, and 
procyclicality must be taken as given. In fact, there seems to exist significant room for both 
aid-recipients and donors to improve the pattern of aid disbursements. For example, a higher 
degree of compliance with conditions attached to aid is likely to lead to a smoother path of 
aid disbursements. However, there are also factors that lead to disruptions in aid 
disbursements over which the recipient country has less control. A country hit by an external 
shock may have its aid flows temporarily suspended because it has delayed the necessary 
adjustment, for example, owing to domestic politics. This necessary adjustment may be 
eventually undertaken, perhaps at a more opportune time, but disbursements would be missed   - 31 -   
and their macroeconomic impact felt long afterward. This is essentially an avoidable problem 
that can be addressed through improved program design.
31 Furthermore, as explained by 
Barrett in the case of U.S. food aid, the procyclicality of aid can be corrected through the 
development of reliable early warning systems to anticipate emergencies and allow donors to 
disburse aid in when it is needed most, or through improved budgetary practices in the donor 
country. The recent emergence of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) is a positive 
development in this regard.
32 The PRSPs are not only expected to lead to better design and 
stronger ownership of the programs supported by multilateral agencies and, thus, to higher 
compliance, but they are also expected to play an important role in coordinating the actions 
of other donors. 
 
                                                   
31 There is some evidence that donors may be insufficiently flexible in certain situations and 
tend to become increasingly prescriptive with reformers once good policies are in place 
(Branson and Hanna, 2000). 
32 For an explanation of the PRSP and its connection with the IMF’s Poverty Reduction and 
Growth Facility, see International Monetary Fund, 2000.   - 32 -   
 Table A1. Volatility of Aid and Revenue and the Aid-to-Revenue Ratio
(Aid and revenue are measured as differences from its Hodrick-Prescott filter)
Absolute volatility of Relative Aid-to-revenue
Aid 1/ Revenue 1/  volatility (F)  ratio 2/
Variables expressed in percent of GDP
All countries (n=72)
Average 9.65 10.23 3.94 70.4
Median 1.95 1.38 1.10 44.9
Sample 1 (aid-to-revenue ratio larger than 10 percent, n=57)
Average 12.18 12.37 4.96 85.9
Median 3.60 1.64 2.19 56.2
Sample 2 (aid-to-revenue ratio larger than 50 percent, n=33)
Average 18.29 18.37 7.42 129.86
Median 6.72 1.80 4.91 112.19
Variables expressed in US dollars per capita
All countries (n=72)
Average 240.04 3268.70 1.33 64.5
Median 25.93 175.37 0.36 36.9
Sample 1 (aid-to-revenue ratio larger than 10 percent, n=55)
Average 308.34 2339.09 1.73 83.1
Median 34.05 70.16 0.80 58.8
Sample 2 (aid-to-revenue ratio larger than 50 percent, n=29)
Average 429.24 97.02 3.00 132.6
Median 34.05 23.76 2.25 113.7
Source: IFS, World Development Indicators, AFR fiscal database; and authors' calculations.
1/ Variances of detrended variables.
2/ In percent.
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Table A2. Volatility of Aid and Revenue; Country Data
Years Volatility (q) Relative  Correlation Aid/revenue Volatility (q) Relative  CorrelationAid/revenue
Aid Revenue volatility coefficient ratio Aid Revenue volatility coefficient ratio
 (F) of aid and  (in percent)  (F) of aid and  (in percent)
revenue revenue
In percent of GDP In U.S. dollars per capita
Argentina 1979-96 0.00 1.33 0.00 0.17 1.54 0.55 7,391.79 0.00 -0.07 1.34
Bangladesh 1975-89 0.68 0.61 1.11 0.21 56.15 3.25 1.92 1.69 0.26 93.33
Belize 1977-89 4.26 0.42 10.22 -0.44 34.85 375.71 465.93 0.81 0.03 27.14
Benin 1985-97 2.26 0.72 3.13 -0.69 101.94 24.44 44.59 0.55 -0.18 101.39
Bolivia 1993-97 0.84 0.39 2.19 0.16 43.84 18.33 201.17 0.09 0.23 47.07
Brazil 1975-94 0.00 7.86 0.00 -0.03 0.46 0.41 9,535.42 0.00 0.23 0.20
Burkina Faso 1992-97 2.23 0.45 4.91 -0.23 125.42 9.27 11.56 0.80 0.53 123.95
Cambodia 1991-97 5.18 1.14 4.53 -0.12 188.33 67.71 9.53 7.10 0.24 168.46
Cameroon 1975-97 1.64 3.72 0.44 -0.39 21.98 26.74 486.23 0.05 -0.09 20.01
Cape Verde 1986-97 2.98 2.71 1.10 0.29 162.05 622.41 244.29 2.55 0.02 184.69
Central  African Rep. 1986-97 5.32 0.62 8.52 -0.07 160.90 53.84 23.76 2.27 0.37 157.48
Chad 1986-97 2.69 0.57 4.74 -0.15 266.37 20.59 5.81 3.54 0.50 254.77
China 1979-97 0.00 0.73 0.00 0.14 2.52 0.04 19.72 0.00 -0.06 2.38
Congo, Dem. Rep. of 1975-97 1.12 1.34 0.84 0.45 54.31 7.33 20.73 0.35 0.58 44.99
Congo, Republic of 1975-97 9.46 8.04 1.18 -0.06 25.30 747.96 1,856.89 0.40 -0.01 22.63
Costa Rica 1975-97 0.70 0.37 1.90 0.42 19.01 130.06 648.67 0.20 0.28 16.31
Cote d'Ivoire 1988-97 12.91 3.82 3.38 0.11 38.84 317.94 255.12 1.25 -0.32 37.16
Djibouti 1985-97 38.47 3.53 10.90 -0.08 87.56 3,174.30 363.05 8.74 -0.21 78.63
Dominican Republic 1975-97 0.28 1.28 0.22 -0.30 10.47 19.15 393.50 0.05 -0.52 9.72
Ecuador 1975-97 0.04 1.21 0.03 -0.53 8.85 5.75 737.76 0.01 -0.06 8.28
Egypt 1975-97 3.27 6.73 0.49 -0.16 16.94 167.50 2,317.52 0.07 -0.88 14.39
Equatorial Guinea 1986-97 18.24 4.92 3.71 0.42 173.97 358.69 390.90 0.92 0.62 149.14
Ethiopia 1981-97 4.19 7.63 0.55 -0.26 70.45 3.29 7.99 0.41 -0.39 58.83
Fiji 1975-97 0.20 0.83 0.24 -0.10 13.66 49.63 562.84 0.09 -0.12 12.56
Gabon 1979-85 0.04 3.10 0.01 -0.51 3.98 125.34 52,537.78 0.00 0.38 4.82
Gambia, The 1975-97 34.20 3.44 9.93 -0.18 123.61 187.36 67.98 2.76 -0.03 119.37
Ghana 1975-97 1.09 3.11 0.35 0.34 46.62 21.39 195.63 0.11 0.09 35.29
Guatemala 1975-97 0.10 0.60 0.17 0.21 15.87 7.26 64.20 0.11 0.03 16.57
Guinea 1986-97 1.68 1.38 1.21 0.10 86.78 39.31 18.42 2.13 -0.07 90.12
Guinea-Bissau 1983-92 70.87 6.28 11.28 0.30 382.58 150.41 38.78 3.88 0.53 372.47
Guyana 1975-97 39.48 8.23 4.80 -0.06 36.00 1,252.43 829.67 1.51 0.04 36.56
Haiti 1975-97 21.91 2.35 9.34 -0.22 94.45 187.03 22.18 8.43 -0.12 97.21
Honduras 1975-97 2.52 0.46 5.51 0.27 45.89 68.10 99.85 0.68 -0.36 48.04
India 1975-97 0.03 0.21 0.17 0.06 7.28 0.15 4.37 0.04 0.27 5.84
Indonesia 1975-97 0.03 0.94 0.03 -0.16 6.23 0.65 82.96 0.01 0.05 5.75
Jamaica 1975-97 0.55 2.08 0.27 0.46 13.73 4.59 1,272.84 0.00 0.00 14.56
Jordan 1975-97 28.46 1.13 25.08 -0.24 63.95 5,952.98 954.75 6.24 -0.08 81.21
Kenya 1975-97 1.53 1.64 0.93 -0.24 33.59 12.73 70.94 0.18 0.24 34.62
Lao People's Dem. Rep.1988-97 16.94 1.23 13.72 0.31 176.40 20.94 11.13 1.88 0.50 174.10
Lesotho 1982-97 3.60 17.01 0.21 0.49 51.00 25.91 70.16 0.37 0.62 46.19
Madagascar 1988-96 5.99 0.69 8.66 -0.45 120.90 28.23 12.10 2.33 0.01 128.11
Malawi 1975-97 12.27 1.63 7.51 0.35 97.98 14.51 17.57 0.83 0.22 97.33
Mali 1975-88 11.00 0.86 12.82 0.12 142.79 25.95 5.82 4.46 0.04 145.89
Mauritania 1990-96 29.00 6.84 4.24 0.61 99.70 307.39 59.81 5.14 0.22 96.87
Mexico 1975-97 0.00 0.46 0.00 -0.24 0.50 0.32 5,883.07 0.00 -0.13 0.50
Mozambique 1980-97 79.78 6.12 13.03 0.23 236.20 34.05 30.38 1.12 -0.10 186.43
Nepal 1975-96 0.62 0.12 5.13 0.20 112.19 2.06 1.05 1.97 0.43 113.73
Nicaragua 1975-96 50.74 516.93 0.10 -0.09 66.71 912.92 113,647.89 0.01 -0.12 36.37
Niger 1985-97 9.63 0.64 15.13 -0.48 183.43 19.20 8.54 2.25 -0.08 176.77
Nigeria 1975-97 0.03 4.63 0.01 -0.33 3.23 0.14 668.24 0.00 0.20 1.40
Pakistan 1975-97 0.48 0.25 1.95 0.12 19.03 3.84 9.01 0.43 0.07 17.42
Panama 1975-96 0.14 1.36 0.10 0.21 4.79 96.52 1,716.84 0.06 0.26 4.51
Papua New Guinea 1975-94 1.67 1.91 0.88 -0.01 53.58 86.51 292.00 0.30 0.05 49.93
Paraguay 1975-93 0.07 0.27 0.26 0.20 17.56 18.76 200.14 0.09 0.18 12.57
Peru 1975-97 0.06 1.37 0.05 0.31 7.55 5.98 581.48 0.01 -0.23 7.23
Philippines 1975-97 0.12 0.36 0.33 -0.06 10.73 4.91 51.13 0.10 -0.20 10.32
Rwanda 1975-85 58.56 3.20 18.32 0.05 197.97 212.25 29.67 7.15 -0.92 177.61
Senegal 1975-84 3.94 2.27 1.73 -0.06 53.28 67.41 160.82 0.42 0.04 52.70
Sierra Leone 1975-97 5.63 1.80 3.14 0.44 107.24 33.70 26.14 1.29 0.40 94.09
Sri Lanka 1975-97 1.34 3.29 0.41 0.04 33.89 8.85 25.39 0.35 0.04 33.55
Swaziland 1975-97 2.34 7.15 0.33 0.58 21.77 96.71 1,057.13 0.09 0.49 19.43
Tanzania 1988-97 8.15 1.33 6.11 0.33 185.18 17.80 20.94 0.85 0.46 113.14
Thailand 1975-97 0.01 0.18 0.07 0.12 5.49 1.60 521.20 0.00 0.57 4.31
Togo 1975-97 4.78 5.07 0.94 0.62 48.98 69.90 189.92 0.37 0.62 47.77
Tunisia 1975-96 0.16 0.72 0.23 -0.22 12.10 28.22 396.03 0.07 0.26 7.82
Turkey 1975-96 0.06 0.62 0.09 0.03 2.90 27.97 1,094.49 0.03 0.22 2.80
Uganda 1975-97 6.72 2.81 2.39 0.10 131.10 7.94 70.82 0.11 -0.03 95.47
Uruguay 1975-97 0.01 1.38 0.01 0.42 1.33 10.78 12,209.22 0.00 0.28 1.29
Venezuela 1975-97 0.00 5.56 0.00 0.95 0.19 0.37 12,922.44 0.00 0.32 0.16
Yemen, Republic of 1990-97 0.75 39.25 0.02 0.84 11.43 20.14 472.71 0.04 0.29 10.31
Zambia 1975-96 58.93 1.92 30.69 0.12 70.98 801.79 153.36 5.23 -0.02 61.14
Zimbabwe 1975-97 1.48 1.11 1.33 0.29 16.74 54.36 472.86 0.11 0.00 16.00
   - 34 -   
K g t p-value K g t p-value
1 Argentina 2 0.99 4.73 0.000 ** 0 0.97 5.03 0.000 **
2 Bangladesh 3 0.14 1.39 0.181 3 0.14 1.39 0.181
3 Belize 3 0.15 1.41 0.174 0 0.20 1.83 0.080
4 Benin 2 -0.02 -0.19 0.853 0 -0.07 -0.67 0.511
5 Bolivia 1 0.08 0.70 0.493 0 0.06 0.60 0.554
6 Brazil 0 1.60 5.28 0.000 ** 0 1.60 5.28 0.000 **
7 Burkina Faso 0 0.04 0.58 0.567 0 0.04 0.58 0.567
8 Cameroon 0 0.00 -0.01 0.988 0 0.00 -0.01 0.988
9 Cape Verde 1 0.00 0.02 0.982 1 0.00 0.02 0.982
10 Central African Republic 0 0.22 2.08 0.049 * 0 0.22 2.08 0.049 *
11 Chad 1 -0.04 -0.26 0.798 1 -0.04 -0.26 0.798
12 China, People's Republic of 9 0.42 4.14 0.006 ** 9 0.42 4.14 0.006 **
13 Congo, Democratic Republic of 0 0.18 1.74 0.097 0 0.18 1.74 0.097
14 Congo, Republic of 1 0.41 3.19 0.005 ** 0 0.44 3.75 0.001 **
15 Costa Rica 0 0.21 2.40 0.024 * 0 0.21 2.40 0.024 *
16 Cote d'Ivoire 0 0.33 2.34 0.028 * 0 0.33 2.34 0.028 *
17 Djibouti 0 0.07 0.54 0.596 0 0.07 0.54 0.596
18 Dominican Republic 1 0.20 1.65 0.113 1 0.20 1.65 0.113
19 Ecuador 0 0.22 1.16 0.259 0 0.22 1.16 0.259
20 Egypt 5 0.32 1.98 0.066 5 0.32 1.98 0.066
21 Equatorial Guinea 0 0.04 0.27 0.789 0 0.04 0.27 0.789
22 Ethiopia 0 0.04 0.95 0.351 0 0.04 0.95 0.351
23 Fiji 0 0.17 1.57 0.130 0 0.17 1.57 0.130
24 Gabon 9 -0.02 -0.10 0.920 9 -0.02 -0.10 0.920
25 Gambia, The 0 0.07 0.55 0.590 0 0.07 0.55 0.590
26 Ghana 0 -0.10 -1.36 0.187 0 -0.10 -1.36 0.187
27 Guatemala 2 0.15 1.24 0.228 1 0.07 0.55 0.588
28 Guinea 1 -0.02 -0.28 0.783 1 -0.02 -0.28 0.783
29 Guinea-Bissau 5 -0.15 -1.54 0.155 5 -0.15 -1.54 0.155
30 Guyana 0 0.25 3.30 0.003 ** 0 0.25 3.30 0.003 **
31 Haiti 0 0.35 2.72 0.015 * 0 0.35 2.72 0.015 *
32 Honduras 2 0.53 3.87 0.001 ** 2 0.53 3.87 0.001 **
33 India 0 0.24 2.18 0.039 * 0 0.24 2.18 0.039 *
34 Indonesia 9 0.22 0.64 0.543 9 0.22 0.64 0.543
35 Jamaica 0 0.27 2.09 0.047 * 0 0.27 2.09 0.047 *
36 Jordan 0 0.08 0.79 0.437 0 0.08 0.79 0.437
37 Kenya 1 0.41 3.50 0.002 ** 0 0.42 3.52 0.002 **
38 Lao, People's Dem. Republic  0 0.29 2.07 0.049 * 0 0.29 2.07 0.049 *
39 Lesotho 2 -0.01 -0.20 0.843 0 -0.01 -0.28 0.779
40 Madascar 9 0.51 3.73 0.007 ** 0 0.24 1.83 0.079
41 Malawi 1 0.11 1.01 0.324 1 0.11 1.01 0.324
42 Mali 2 0.05 0.72 0.480 2 0.05 0.72 0.480
43 Mauritania 6 0.16 1.13 0.278 1 0.10 1.08 0.293
44 Mexico 0 0.72 8.21 0.000 ** 0 0.72 8.21 0.000 **
45 Mozambique 3 0.06 0.55 0.610 3 0.06 0.55 0.610
46 Nepal 0 -0.03 -0.60 0.553 0 -0.03 -0.60 0.553
47 Nicaragua 0 0.17 1.97 0.060 0 0.17 1.97 0.060
48 Niger 0 0.40 1.87 0.074 0 0.40 1.87 0.074
49 Nigeria 0 0.12 1.39 0.175 0 0.12 1.39 0.175
50 Pakistan 2 0.22 1.92 0.069 1 0.24 2.13 0.044 *
51 Panama 1 0.87 6.77 0.000 ** 1 0.87 6.77 0.000 **
52 Papua New Guinea 1 -0.54 -0.84 0.408 1 -0.54 -0.84 0.408
53 Paraguay 1 0.04 0.69 0.499 0 0.04 0.60 0.551
54 Peru 1 0.10 0.62 0.543 1 0.10 0.62 0.543
55 Philippines 6 0.27 1.41 0.183 2 0.30 1.65 0.114
56 Rwanda 0 0.05 0.85 0.404 0 0.05 0.85 0.404
57 Senegal 2 0.27 2.33 0.030 * 0 0.33 2.90 0.008 **
58 Sierra Leone 1 0.13 1.31 0.203 1 0.13 1.31 0.203
59 Sri Lanka 1 0.04 0.54 0.597 1 0.04 0.54 0.597
60 Swaziland 8 0.04 0.48 0.645 8 0.04 0.48 0.645
61 Tanzania 2 -0.04 -0.30 0.767 2 -0.04 -0.30 0.767
62 Thailand 2 -0.51 -2.96 0.007 ** 2 -0.51 -2.96 0.007 **
63 Togo 9 0.06 0.33 0.755 9 0.06 0.33 0.755
64 Tunisia 1 0.18 2.82 0.010 ** 1 0.18 2.82 0.010 **
65 Turkey 9 0.99 2.31 0.054 3 1.07 4.25 0.000 **
66 Uganda 2 0.33 2.81 0.011 * 2 0.33 2.81 0.011 *
67 Uruguay 3 0.30 2.16 0.044 * 1 0.36 2.79 0.010 **
68 Venezuela 1 0.93 6.97 0.000 ** 1 0.93 6.97 0.000 **
69 Yemen, Republic of 0 0.03 0.54 0.595 0 0.03 0.54 0.595
70 Zambia 9 -0.07 -0.20 0.844 1 0.50 3.57 0.002 **
71 Zimbabwe 0 0.26 2.16 0.045 * 0 0.26 2.16 0.045 *
**: Significant at the 1 percent level.
*: Significant at the 5 percent level.
Table A3. Statistical Significance of Commitments in Forecasting Actual Disbursements
AIC SBIC
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Table A4.  List of Countries Used in the Survey
Country Period Type of Fund Arrangement
Albania January 1998-December 1998 ESAF
Algeria July 1998-June 1999 EFF
Azerbaijan January 1998-December 1998 ESAF
Bolivia January 1998-December 1998 ESAF
Burkina Faso January 1998-December 1998 ESAF
Cambodia January 1998-December 1998 ESAF
Cameroon July 1998-June 1999 ESAF
Cape Verde Jan 1998-Dec 1998 Stand-By
Central African Republic January 1998-December 1998 ESAF
Côte d'Ivoire January 1998-December 1998 ESAF
Djibouti January 1998-December 1998 ESAF
Dominican Republic January 1998-December 1998 None
Ecuador January 1998-December 1998 None
Egypt June 1998-June 1999 Stand-By
El Salvador December 1997-December 1998 Stand-By
FYR Macedonia January 1998-December 1998 ESAF
Gabon January 1998-December 1998 EFF
Ghana January 1998- December 1998 ESAF
Guyana January 1998-December 1998 ESAF
Indonesia April 1998-March 1999 Stand-By/EFF
Jordan January 1998-December 1998 EFF
Kyrgyz Republic January 1998-December 1998 ESAF
Lao P.D.R. October 1997-September 1998 None
Madagascar January 1998-December 1998 ESAF
Mauritania January 1998- December 1998 ESAF
Mongolia January 1998-December 1999 ESAF
Mozambique December 1997-December 1998 ESAF
Nepal July 16, 1998-July 15, 1999 None
Nigeria January 1998-December 1998 None
Panama January 1998-December 1998 EFF
Papua New Guinea January 1998-December 1998 None
Republic of Congo December 1997-December 1998 ESAF
Sierra Leone January 1998- December 1998 ESAF
Tajikistan July 1998-June 1999 ESAF
Yemen January 1998-December 1997 ESAF
Zambia January 1998-December 1998 ESAF
Zimbabwe January 1998-December 1998 Stand-By  - 36 -   
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